This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management affects ยฎrms' R&D and production decisions in Cournot quantity competition. It is found that when R&D spillovers are small, owners strategically direct their managers away from proยฎt maximization towards sales. Consequently, managerial
R&D in a strategic delegation game revisited: a note
โ Scribed by Michael Kopel; Christian Riegler
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2006
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 130 KB
- Volume
- 27
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0143-6570
- DOI
- 10.1002/mde.1271
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
In this note we reconsider the paper of Zhang and Zhang (1997), published in Managerial and Decision Economics, who analyze a strategic delegation model with R&D spillovers in an imperfectly competitive market. We were motivated to study their setup by a puzzling result given in their paper: delegating the production and R&D decisions to managers is never beneficial for the owners of the firm. When we tried to understand the driving forces of this result, we found however that the findings of Zhang and Zhang (1997) are incorrect. We explain why their derivations are wrong and demonstrate via counterexamples that the main propositions in their paper do not hold. In addition, we show how the correct solution of this R&D model with spillovers can be obtained.
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## Abstract In this paper the shearing advection term, suggested recently by H. Lettau, is introduced into the wellโknown twoโdimensional equation formulated by Sutton and Calder in their treatment of turbulent diffusion, and a solution of the ensuing equation is obtained subject to the conditions