𝔖 Bobbio Scriptorium
✦   LIBER   ✦

Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments

✍ Scribed by Matthias Kräkel

Book ID
106262595
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2005
Tongue
English
Weight
205 KB
Volume
9
Category
Article
ISSN
1434-4750

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

R&D spillovers and strategic delegation
R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests
✍ Matthias Kräkel 📂 Article 📅 2004 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 149 KB

## Abstract Considering oligopolistic contests with R&D spillovers and strategic delegation three results can be obtained: (1) There exist multiple asymmetric equilibria where one owner highly favors sales as a basis for his manager's incentives which drives the other firm out of the market. (2) If

Commitment in R&D tournaments via strate
Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers
✍ Florian Englmaier 📂 Article 📅 2010 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 134 KB

This paper shows that it is profitable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain investment strategy in an R&D tournament situation. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, all firms delegate to overoptimistic managers, where the optimal degree of overoptimism depends on the r