## Abstract Considering oligopolistic contests with R&D spillovers and strategic delegation three results can be obtained: (1) There exist multiple asymmetric equilibria where one owner highly favors sales as a basis for his manager's incentives which drives the other firm out of the market. (2) If
✦ LIBER ✦
Strategic delegation and mergers in oligopolistic contests
✍ Scribed by Matthias Kräkel; Dirk Sliwka
- Book ID
- 116636129
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2006
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 222 KB
- Volume
- 58
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0148-6195
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