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Status signaling games in animal contests

✍ Scribed by Yong-Gwan Kim

Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1995
Tongue
English
Weight
441 KB
Volume
176
Category
Article
ISSN
0022-5193

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✦ Synopsis

This paper provides evolutionary game-theoretic models for the status signaling problem in animal contests. Two stage status signaling game models are introduced and evolutionarily stable strategies and their modifications are characterized for the games. It is shown that in the stable long-run equilibria, animals must make use of signals systematically to settle the contest peacefully.

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