Learning and transfer in signaling games
β Scribed by David J. Cooper; John H. Kagel
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 2007
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 281 KB
- Volume
- 34
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0938-2259
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