Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
✍ Scribed by Emilio Calvo; Esther Gutiérrez
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2010
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 266 KB
- Volume
- 60
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0165-4896
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
A new axiomatic characterization of the two-step Shapley value Kamijo ( 2009) is presented based on a solidarity principle of the members of any union: when the game changes due to the addition or deletion of players outside the union, all members of the union will share the same gains/losses.
📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES
In this paper, the fuzzy core of games with fuzzy coalition is proposed, which can be regarded as the generalization of crisp core. The fuzzy core is based on the assumption that the total worth of a fuzzy coalition will be allocated to the players whose participation rate is larger than zero. The n