The fuzzy core in games with fuzzy coalitions
β Scribed by Xiaohui Yu; Qiang Zhang
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2009
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 733 KB
- Volume
- 230
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0377-0427
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β¦ Synopsis
In this paper, the fuzzy core of games with fuzzy coalition is proposed, which can be regarded as the generalization of crisp core. The fuzzy core is based on the assumption that the total worth of a fuzzy coalition will be allocated to the players whose participation rate is larger than zero. The nonempty condition of the fuzzy core is given based on the fuzzy convexity. Three kinds of special fuzzy cores in games with fuzzy coalition are studied, and the explicit fuzzy core represented by the crisp core is also given. Because the fuzzy Shapley value had been proposed as a kind of solution for the fuzzy games, the relationship between fuzzy core and the fuzzy Shapley function is also shown. Surprisingly, the relationship between fuzzy core and the fuzzy Shapley value does coincide, as in the classical case.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
In this paper, cores and stable sets for games with fuzzy coalitions are introduced and their relations studied. For convex fuzzy games it turns out that all cores coincide and that the core is the unique stable set. Also relations between cores and stable sets of fuzzy clan games are discussed.
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