Social choice with procedural preferences

✍ Scribed by Sven O. Hansson

• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 1996
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 893 KB
• Volume: 13
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0176-1714
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00183352

✦ Synopsis

Participants in an aggregation procedure have preferences not only over outcomes but also over procedural features (such as preferring consensus, preferring to be in the majority, preferring not having to compromise, etc.) Such procedural preferences can be expressed in a framework that, contrary to the traditional Arrovian framework, has voting patterns rather than outcomes as comparison classes. The extended framework helps us to resolve several of the puzzles of social choice theory. The (more or less anti-democratic) political conclusions that some author have been willing to draw from results in the Arrovian framework are shown to rely on formal restrictions that are present in that framework but not in the extended framework that is presented here.