Yang and Shieh proposed a timestamp-based password authentication scheme. Chan and Cheng proved that it is insecure. In this paper, we will give a further cryptanalysis of the scheme, and give an easier attack on it. Finally, we will propose an improved scheme that can withstand both of the attacks.
Security improvement on a timestamp-based password authentication scheme
โ Scribed by Yingjie Wang; Jianhua Li
- Book ID
- 117909639
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Year
- 2004
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 370 KB
- Volume
- 50
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0098-3063
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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