Yang and Shieh proposed a timestamp-based password authentication scheme. Chan and Cheng proved that it is insecure. In this paper, we will give a further cryptanalysis of the scheme, and give an easier attack on it. Finally, we will propose an improved scheme that can withstand both of the attacks.
Cryptanalysis of an enhanced timestamp-based password authentication scheme
β Scribed by Bin Wang; Jian-Hua Li; Zhi-Peng Tong
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2003
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 105 KB
- Volume
- 22
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0167-4048
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Recently, Fan proposed an enhanced scheme to improve the security of Yang-Shieh's timestamp-based password authentication scheme. The enhanced scheme can withstand the attacks presented by Chan, Cheng and Fan. In this paper, we show that the enhanced scheme is still insecure. An intruder is able to construct a forged login request by intercepting the legitimate login requests and pass the system authentication with a nonnegligible probability.
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