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Rewriting-Based Verification of Authentication Protocols

โœ Scribed by Kazuhiro Ogata; Kokichi Futatsugi


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2004
Tongue
English
Weight
266 KB
Volume
71
Category
Article
ISSN
1571-0661

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โœฆ Synopsis


We propose a method of formally analysing security protocols based on rewriting. The method is roughly as follows. A security protocol is modeled as an observational transition system, which is described in CafeOBJ. Proof scores showing that the protocol has safety (security) properties are then written in CafeOBJ and the proof scores are executed (rewritten) by the CafeOBJ system.


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