Rewriting-Based Verification of Authentication Protocols
โ Scribed by Kazuhiro Ogata; Kokichi Futatsugi
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2004
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 266 KB
- Volume
- 71
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1571-0661
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
We propose a method of formally analysing security protocols based on rewriting. The method is roughly as follows. A security protocol is modeled as an observational transition system, which is described in CafeOBJ. Proof scores showing that the protocol has safety (security) properties are then written in CafeOBJ and the proof scores are executed (rewritten) by the CafeOBJ system.
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