We propose a method of formally analysing security protocols based on rewriting. The method is roughly as follows. A security protocol is modeled as an observational transition system, which is described in CafeOBJ. Proof scores showing that the protocol has safety (security) properties are then wri
ECFSM-based probabilistic protocol verification
โ Scribed by Chung-Ming Huang; Jenq-Muh Hsu; Shiun-Wei Lee
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1995
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 737 KB
- Volume
- 55
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0020-0190
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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