Cover......Page 1
Resolving Controversy in the European Union......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Figures......Page 9
Tables......Page 11
Acknowledgements......Page 14
1.1 Diversity and controversy in the European Union......Page 17
1.2 Analysing contemporary EU decision-making as a political system......Page 21
1.3 Legislative decision-making in the EU: actors and decision-making procedures......Page 24
1.4 An institutional approach to analysing decision-making......Page 31
1.5 Outline of the book......Page 33
2.1 Applying the spatial model of politics to legislative decision-making in the European Union......Page 37
2.2 Legislative proposals selected by researchers......Page 43
2.3 The experts selected by researchers......Page 48
2.4 Reconstructing controversial issues with experts......Page 54
2.5 Expert judgements of actors and their policy positions......Page 56
2.6 Expert judgements of the reference points......Page 59
2.7 Expert judgements of issue salience......Page 60
2.8 Analysing the data......Page 63
Part I: Inputs......Page 65
3: The European Union’s political space......Page 67
3.1 Previous research on the European Union’s political space......Page 68
3.2 Research design......Page 74
3.3 Multidimensional scaling analyses......Page 78
3.4 Issue-level analyses......Page 80
3.5 Conclusions......Page 92
4.1 A supranational technocrat, a party political ideologue or a multinational?......Page 95
4.2 Expectations regarding the Commission’s policy positions......Page 98
4.3 Research design......Page 102
4.4 Analysis of the Commission’s policy positions......Page 108
4.5 Conclusions......Page 114
5.1 Policy positions and committee structures in the European Parliament1......Page 118
5.2 Expectations regarding the European Parliament’s policy positions......Page 122
5.3 Research design......Page 128
The EP’s policy positions in the fourth, fifth and sixth legislatures......Page 133
The median legislator on forty controversial issues......Page 135
The impact of rapporteurs on the European Parliament’s policy positions......Page 140
5.5 Conclusions......Page 145
6.1 Member states’ policy preferences and positions......Page 148
6.2 Expectations regarding member states’ policy positions......Page 150
6.3 Research design......Page 155
6.4 Analyses......Page 161
6.5 Conclusions......Page 171
Part II: Processes......Page 173
7.1 From inputs to outputs......Page 175
A procedural model......Page 177
The Nash bargaining solution with the disagreement outcome as the reference point (NBS-RP)......Page 182
The Nash bargaining solution without the reference point (NBS-no RP)......Page 185
The minimax solution......Page 187
7.3 Research design......Page 189
7.4 The models’ predictive accuracy......Page 195
7.5 Conclusions......Page 201
8.1 Supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism......Page 204
8.2 Modelling supranationalism and intergovernmentalism......Page 209
Supranational versus intergovernmental models......Page 210
Finding the best-fitting power distributions......Page 211
8.3 Research design......Page 214
The predictive accuracy of supranational and intergovernmental models......Page 217
The best-fitting power distributions......Page 220
8.5 Conclusions......Page 225
9.1 Large and small; old and new......Page 228
P2: Power is distributed in a regressive form among member states in the Council (the ‘regressive’ distribution).......Page 229
P5: All power is held by France and Germany in the Council (the ‘Franco-German’ distribution).......Page 232
9.3 Research design......Page 233
9.4 The predictive accuracy of different distributions of power among states......Page 236
9.5 Conclusions......Page 240
Part III: Outputs......Page 243
10.1 Winners and losers with respect to decision outcomes......Page 245
10.2 Explaining incongruence between decision outcomes and policy positions......Page 246
‘Luck’ and distance to other actors’ policy positions......Page 247
H2: The greater the distance between a member state’s position and the Commission’s position, the greater the distance between that state’s position and the decision outcome.......Page 248
H3: When the co-decision procedure applies, the greater the distance between a member state’s position and the EP’s position, the greater the distance between that state’s position and the decision outcome.......Page 249
H4: The more salience a member state attaches to an issue compared to other states, the smaller the distance between that state’s position and the decision outcome.......Page 250
The Council presidency......Page 251
Member states’ characteristics: voting power, population size and wealth......Page 253
10.3 Research design......Page 254
10.4 Analysis of the incongruence between actors’ positions and decision outcomes......Page 258
10.5 Conclusions......Page 265
11.1 Delegating discretion to resolve controversy......Page 268
11.2 Three perspectives on delegation in the European Union......Page 270
The transaction-costs perspective......Page 271
The commitment perspective on delegation to the Commission......Page 274
H5: Decision outcomes are more likely to grant discretion to member states when member states’ policy positions in the Council are more polarized.......Page 276
11.3 Research design......Page 277
Delegation to the Commission......Page 283
Delegation to member states......Page 287
11.5 Conclusions......Page 291
12.1 Continuity and change in European Union decision-making since enlargement......Page 295
12.2 The European Union’s democratic deficit......Page 300
12.3 Reforms to improve the European Union......Page 308
AGRICULTURE......Page 313
INTERNAL MARKET......Page 314
GENERAL AFFAIRS......Page 315
FISHERIES......Page 316
TRANSPORT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS......Page 317
CULTURE......Page 318
INDUSTRY......Page 319
References......Page 320
Index......Page 336