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Preferences and Procedures: European Union Legislative Decision-Making

โœ Scribed by Torsten J. Selck


Year
2006
Tongue
English
Leaves
106
Edition
1
Category
Library

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โœฆ Synopsis


Preferences and Procedures presents and tests game-theoretic models of European Union legislative decision-making. It is inspired by the idea of linking statistical testing strategies firmly to formal models of EU policymaking. After describing salient features of the EU legislative process and comparing different models of how the EU negotiates new legislative measures, the models' predictive power is evaluated. On a more general level, Preferences and Procedures answers questions regarding the empirically recognizable effects of institutional arrangements on joint bargaining outcomes.


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