Rescuing Justice and Equality

✍ Scribed by G. A. Cohen

• Publisher: Harvard University Press
• Year: 2008
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 449
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

In this work of political philosophy, Cohen sets out to rescue the egalitarian thesis that in a society where distributive justice prevails, people’s material prospects are roughly equal. Arguing against the Rawlsian version of a just society, Cohen demonstrates that distributive justice does not tolerate deep inequality.

✦ Table of Contents

CONTENTS
SHORT TABLE OF CONTENTS
LONG TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
Introduction
1. The Big Issue
2. Rescuing Equality and Justice
3. Some Methodological Disagreements
4. Justice and Fairness
5. The Two Standpoints
6. The Greatness of John Rawls
7. An Outline of the Book
I RESCUING EQUALITY FROM . . .
1 The Incentives Argument
I: The Incentives Argument, the Interpersonal Test, and Community
1. Incentives, the Difference Principle, and Equality
2. Nigel Lawson’s Tax Cut
3. On Uttering Arguments in Variable Interpersonal Settings
4. The Kidnapper’s Argument
5. Community, and the Interpersonal Test
6. Does the Incentives Argument Pass the Interpersonal Test?
II: Testing the Incentives Argument
7. What Makes the Minor Premise of the Incentives Argument True?
8. Why the Incentives Argument Fails the Interpersonal Test
9. The Incentives Argument and Bad Faith
10. Should the Poor Reject the Incentives Argument?
11. First Persons and Third Persons
III: Incentives and the Difference Principle
12. Strict and Lax Readings of the Difference Principle
13. Why Just People Must Practice the Strict Difference Principle
14. The Difference Principle and “Daily Life”
15. Dignity, Fraternity, and the Difference Principle
16. The Difference Principle and “Mutual Indifference”
17. The Difference Principle and the Unjust Society
2 The Pareto Argument
1. Introduction
2. The Argument Expounded
3. The Argument Challenged
4. The Argument Rejected
5. Labor Burden in the Metric of Equality
6. Inconsistent Metrics
7. Raising the Baseline
8. Impartiality and Mutual Advantage
9. Inequality: A Necessary Evil?
10. Conclusion
3 The Basic Structure Objection
1. “The Personal Is Political”
2. Incentives and the Difference Principle: A Review of the Argument
3. The Basic Structure Objection
4. The Basic Structure Objection: A Preliminary Reply
5. The Basic Structure Objection: A More Fundamental Reply
6. Who Is to Blame?
7. Coercive and Noncoercive Social Structures
Appendix I: More on Coercion and the Basic Structure (Added, 2008)
Appendix II: The Basic Structure Is a Structure (Added, 2008)
4 The Difference Principle
1. Introduction
2. Reconsidering the Difference Principle
3. The Moral Arbitrariness Case for the Difference Principle Contradicts Its Content
4. A Recent Argument for the Difference Principle
5. A Contractarian Argument for the Difference Principle
6. What Is the Moral Arbitrariness of Talent Differences Supposed to Show?
7. Chamberlain and Pareto
8. “Can’t” or “Won’t”
9. Human Nature and Constructivism
5 The Freedom Objection
1. Introduction
2. Equality, Pareto, and Freedom of Choice of Occupation
3. Equality, Pareto, and Rawlsian Liberty
4. Equality, Pareto, and Freedom in Work
5. The Unequal-Income Inference
6. Blood, Kidneys, and Sex
II RESCUING JUSTICE FROM . . .
6 The Facts
1. A Statement of My Thesis
2. Facts, and Some Meta-Ethical Questions
3. What Most Philosophers Think about Facts and Principles
4. My Thesis: Ultimate Principles Are Fact-Insensitive; and the Clarity of Mind Requirement
5. An Illustration of the Thesis
6. More Illustration of the Thesis
7. The Argument for the Thesis
7(i). A Defense of the First Premise of the Argument
7(ii). A Defense of the Second Premise of the Argument
7(iii). A Defense of the Third Premise of the Argument
8. Still Further Illustration and Defense of the Thesis
9. The Clarity of Mind Requirement
10. The Merely Logical Priority of Fact-Insensitive Principles
11. The Conditional Character of the Thesis
12. On “Is” and “Ought”
13. On “Ought” and “Can”
14. Possible Misunderstandings of the Thesis
15. The Thesis Is Not a Causal Thesis
16. The Thesis Is Not a Psychological Thesis
17. The Thesis Is Neutral with Respect to Central Meta-Ethical Disputes
18. Some Bad Rawlsian Arguments That Reject My Thesis
19. Utilitarianism, and the Difference Between Fundamental Principles and Rules of Regulation
20. The Interest of My Thesis
Appendix: God
7 Constructivism
1. Introduction, and Preliminary Overview
2. Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism
3. Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism: Matters Arising
4. Is Justice the First Virtue of Social Institutions?
5. Two Illustrations: Social Insurance, Property Taxation
6. Justice and the Pareto Principle
7. Justice and Constraints, Notably Publicity, on Choice of Optimal Rules of Regulation
8. Justice and Stability
9. The “Circumstances of Justice”
10. Conclusion
Appendix: Is the Original Position Justification of the Two Principles Contractarian?
8 The Publicity Argument
1. Andrew Williams on Publicity and the Egalitarian Ethos
2. An Anatomy of Williams’s Argument
3. Racism, Justice, and Assurance
4. Does Assurance Require Williams-type Determinacy?
5. Does Justice Require Precision?
6. Egalitarian Ethoses at Home, in the Market, and in the State
7. Publicity as a Desideratum of Justice
8. Publicity and Occupational Choice
General Appendix: Replies to Critics
1. Public and Private Action
2. The Site of Justice Is Not Where It Gets Caused
3. Prior Principles, Self-Respect, and Equality
4. Incentives and Prerogatives
5. Pogge’s Mastergoals and Supergoals
6. Pogge’s Failure to Address the Standard Case
7. The Currency of Distributive Justice and Incentive Inequality
8. Earlier Discussions of Rawls on Incentives
Backmatter
Bibliography
Credits
Name Index
Subject Index