✦ LIBER ✦

Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria

✍ Scribed by Kjell Hausken

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games

✍ Sylvain Sorin 📂 Article 📅 1999 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 217 KB

Correlated equilibria in a class of repe

✍ F. Forges 📂 Article 📅 1985 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 984 KB

Note on nash equilibria in infinitely re

✍ F. Forges 📂 Article 📅 1984 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 302 KB

A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeate

✍ Françoise Forges; Enrico Minelli 📂 Article 📅 1997 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 187 KB

Equilibria in repeated games of incomple

✍ Abraham Neyman; Sylvain Sorin 📂 Article 📅 1998 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 176 KB

Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Inc

✍ Johannes Hörner; Stefano Lovo 📂 Article 📅 2009 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 322 KB