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Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information

✍ Scribed by F. Forges

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

Note on nash equilibria in infinitely re

✍ F. Forges 📂 Article 📅 1984 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 302 KB

Optimal strategies in repeated games wit

✍ E. Kohlberg 📂 Article 📅 1975 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 725 KB

Asymptotically optimal strategies in rep

✍ M. Heuer 📂 Article 📅 1992 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 524 KB

Correlated equilibria in repeated games

✍ F. Forges 📂 Article 📅 1986 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 860 KB

Minmax and maxmin of repeated games with

✍ J. -F. Mertens; S. Zamir 📂 Article 📅 1980 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 683 KB

The information revealed in infinitely-r

✍ E. Kohlberg 📂 Article 📅 1975 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 144 KB