𝔖 Bobbio Scriptorium
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Reasonable reasons for waiting

✍ Scribed by Orit E. Tykocinski; Bradley J. Ruffle


Publisher
John Wiley and Sons
Year
2003
Tongue
English
Weight
85 KB
Volume
16
Category
Article
ISSN
0894-3257

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis


Abstract

Recent decision‐making research claims to establish that, in violation of Savage's normative sure‐thing principle, individuals often wait to acquire noninstrumental information and subsequently base their decisions upon this information. The current research suggests that characterizing individuals as pursuing noninstrumental or useless information may be overstated. Through a series of experiments we establish, first, that many people choose to wait, even when waiting provides no additional information at all. Second, the longer people are allowed to wait before having to decide, the more people prefer to wait rather than decide immediately. Third, those individuals who choose to wait are the ones less confident about committing themselves to a decision. For them, the benefit from waiting may be especially valuable by allowing them to come to terms with a less‐than‐ideal decision. Copyright Β© 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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