๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
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Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions

โœ Scribed by Pierpaolo Battigalli; Marciano Siniscalchi


Book ID
117609962
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2003
Tongue
English
Weight
367 KB
Volume
45
Category
Article
ISSN
0899-8256

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.


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On the equivalence between descending bi
โœ Edi Karni ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1988 ๐Ÿ› Springer US ๐ŸŒ English โš– 308 KB

Bidding the same price in descending bid auctions and in first price sealed bid auctions is equivalent to expected utility maximizing behavior, and this is equivalent to dynamically consistent bidding. The claim that, in strategic form, descending bid and first price sealed bid auctions are the same