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Public good provision under environmental and social uncertainty

โœ Scribed by Arjaan Wit; Henk Wilke


Publisher
John Wiley and Sons
Year
1998
Tongue
English
Weight
140 KB
Volume
28
Category
Article
ISSN
0046-2772

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โœฆ Synopsis


Social dilemmas face people with various kinds of uncertainty. To extend earlier research on environmental uncertainty in resource dilemmas (i.e. uncertainty about the resource size), the present experiment examines the eects of Environmental Uncertainty (low, high uncertainty about the provision point) and Social Uncertainty (low, high uncertainty about others' cooperation) in a public goods dilemma. In line with Social Comparison Theory, it was predicted and found that Environmental Uncertainty decreases cooperation only under High Social Uncertainty, but not under Low Social Uncertainty. The detrimental eects of Environmental Uncertainty can be counteracted by uncertainty reducing information on the provision point and/or on others' contributions as well.


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