## Abstract The reasons for the highly efficient market outcomes observed under the double auction remain unclear. This paper presents a series of experimental financial markets designed to investigate the importance of unknown trading period duration on trading behavior and the convergence tendenc
Price efficiency in the art auction market
โ Scribed by M. A. Louargand; J. R. McDaniel
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1991
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 535 KB
- Volume
- 15
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0885-2545
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
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