On the convergence of genetic learning in a double auction market
β Scribed by Herbert Dawid
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1999
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 221 KB
- Volume
- 23
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0165-1889
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
We study the learning behavior of a population of buyers and a population of sellers whose members are repeatedly randomly matched to engage in a sealed bid double auction. The agents are assumed to be boundedly rational and choose their strategies by imitating successful behavior and adding innovations triggered by random errors or communication with other agents. This process is modelled by a two-population genetic algorithm. A general characterization of the equilibria in mixed population distributions is given and it is shown analytically that only one price equilibria are attractive for the GA dynamics. Simulation results con"rm these "ndings and imply that in cases with random initialization with high probability the gain of trade is equally split between buyers and sellers.
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