In biology altruistic behaviour of selfish individuals often can be modelled by the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game (PD). If the opponents are caught repeatedly in this dilemma reciprocity may lead to cooperative strategies adopted by the individuals. In this article we present results from numeric
Population structure, spite, and the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
โ Scribed by Gregory B. Pollock
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 1988
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 965 KB
- Volume
- 77
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0002-9483
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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