Point-hyperplane axioms for orthogonal geometries
β Scribed by James T. Smith
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 1985
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 321 KB
- Volume
- 17
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0046-5755
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
The purpose of this article is an extension of Shapley's value for games with restricted cooperation. The classical model of cooperative game where every subset of players is a feasible coalition may be unrealistic. The feasible coalitions in our model will be the convex sets, i.e., those subsets of
If B(a, b, c), then -B ( a , c, b). A 8. If points a, b and c are collinear and distinct, then at least one of B ( a , b, c), B ( b , c, a) or B(c, a, b) is true. In view of T 2.2, T 2.3, and T 2.4 exactly one of B ( a , b, c), B ( b , c, a ) , B ( c , a , b) is true. T2.5. If B ( a , b, d ) and B