What follows are concrete comments to [3] concerning the main goal of [2], the study in Fuzzy Set Theory of the law: (i) Provided the system in [1] contains P 0 such that tP 0 0 (if not, what?), (\*) yields MaxtP Y 1 Γ tP 1 for any assertion P. Hence, from the very beginning the system can only con
Paradoxes of fuzzy logic, revisited
β Scribed by Charles Elkan
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2001
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 46 KB
- Volume
- 26
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0888-613X
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
This paper is a reply to the article entitled Elkan's Theoretical Argument, Reconsidered by Prof. Enric Trillas and Prof. Claudi Alsina. I would like to express my thanks to Dr. Piero Bonissone for inviting me to write this paper and for showing me the article by Trillas and Alsina in advance of its publication.
Ever since mathematical studies of fuzziness began with a 1965 paper entitled Fuzzy Sets by Zadeh , it has been important to distinguish between fuzzy logic and fuzzy set theory. The theorem in my paper The Paradoxical Success of Fuzzy Logic, as published in 1993 [1] and also as revised in 1994 , is a result about standard fuzzy logic. The paper of Trillas and Alsina concerns fuzzy sets, and therefore erroneously states that the theorem is false.
At the start of their Section 2, Trillas and Alsina wrote: ``An equivalent formulation in Fuzzy Logic to what Prof. Elkan claimed in Refs. [8,9] is:
The statement quoted is not equivalent to the claim in my paper, because my theorem is not about fuzzy sets in 0Y 1 X . Instead, it is about something simpler but of greater practical importance: fuzzy truth values attached to individual
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
The method of approximate reasoning using a fuzzy logic introduced by Baldwin (1978 a,b,c), is used to model human reasoning in the resolution of two well known paradoxes. It is shown how classical propositional logic fails to resolve the paradoxes, how multiple valued logic partially succeeds and
Edited By Dale Jacquette. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.
The paper makes explicit the nature of some logical paradoxes by representing them in the form of logical nets, or simple finite automata expressed in the structural language as logical nets, both binary and non-classic multivalued ones. In this representation the structure of the problems turning e
Haack (1979) has questioned the need for fuzzy logic on methodological and linguistic grounds. However: three possible roles for fuzzy logic should be distinguished; as a requisite apparatus--because the world poses fuzzy problems; as a prescriptive apparatus-the only proper calculus for the mani