On the nature of some logical paradoxes
β Scribed by V. Pinkava
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1977
- Weight
- 902 KB
- Volume
- 9
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0020-7373
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β¦ Synopsis
The paper makes explicit the nature of some logical paradoxes by representing them in the form of logical nets, or simple finite automata expressed in the structural language as logical nets, both binary and non-classic multivalued ones. In this representation the structure of the problems turning eventually into paradoxes is expressed by the structure of the respective logical nets and the course of reasoning about the problems by the behaviour of these nets. All the nets in question have memory, this standing for the fact that they depend on self-reference. It is shown, however, that this is not the only sufficient and necessary condition for a problem of this class to turn into a paradox.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
One rational individual may be willing to pay less than another to insure a risk ~ when another risk ri, is present even though he would pay more to insure any isolated risk, and even though E(~ [~i,) = 0 for all w. Noticing this, Ross (1981) proposed excluding such reversals and gave equivalent ana