✦ LIBER ✦

Optimal Incentive Contracting with Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazards: Theory and Evidence

✍ Scribed by ROBERT PUELZ; ARTHUR SNOW

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

093035 (M32) Optimal incentive contracti

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stationary models is given. In principle it is modification of the well-known Levinson predictor.

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