✦ LIBER ✦

Contracting under ex post moral hazard and non-commitment

✍ Scribed by M. Martin Boyer

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

Observable Contracts as Commitments: Int

✍ Michael L. Katz 📂 Article 📅 2006 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 251 KB

Optimal Incentive Contracting with Ex An

✍ ROBERT PUELZ; ARTHUR SNOW 📂 Article 📅 1997 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 232 KB

Ex Post Moral Hazard and Bayesian Learni

✍ Michael Ludkovski; Virginia R. Young 📂 Article 📅 2010 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 516 KB

A mechanism design approach to an optima

✍ C. Choe 📂 Article 📅 1998 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 191 KB

093035 (M32) Optimal incentive contracti

📂 Article 📅 1997 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 81 KB

stationary models is given. In principle it is modification of the well-known Levinson predictor.

Dynamic Incentive Contracts under No-Com

✍ Hsiao-Chi Chen; Shi-Miin Liu 📂 Article 📅 2005 🏛 Springer Vienna 🌐 English ⚖ 443 KB