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Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary

โœ Scribed by Liang, Pinghan

Book ID
121780387
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2013
Tongue
English
Weight
425 KB
Volume
82
Category
Article
ISSN
0899-8256

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