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Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts

โœ Scribed by Kockesen, Levent; Ok, Efe A.

Book ID
108504921
Publisher
John Wiley and Sons
Year
2004
Tongue
English
Weight
292 KB
Volume
71
Category
Article
ISSN
0034-6527

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## Abstract Owners usually want their managers to maximize profits. As the literature on strategic delegation has shown it may be beneficial to owners to put a positive weight on sales in the optimal linear incentive scheme for managers to make them behave more aggressively in the market. This pape