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One-dimensionality and stability in legislative voting

✍ Scribed by Thomas Schwartz

Publisher: Springer US
Year: 2010
Tongue: English
Weight: 606 KB
Volume: 148
Category: Article
ISSN: 0048-5829
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9652-3

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