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On the structure of fuzzy social welfare functions

โœ Scribed by C.R. Barrett; Prasanta K. Pattanaik; Maurice Salles

Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1986
Tongue
English
Weight
507 KB
Volume
19
Category
Article
ISSN
0165-0114

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โœฆ Synopsis

We investigate the structure of fuzzy aggregation rules which, for every permissible profile of individual preferences, specify a fuzzy social ordering. It is shown that all fuzzy aggregation rules which have non-narrow domains and which satisfy the fuzzy counterparts of independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto criterion are characterized by a distribution of 'veto' power which would be generally considered undesirable.

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This paper provides an extension of Nash's bargaining model. The extension permits the domain of a solution function to contain non-convex sets. First, it is shown that the proposed extension is a mathematical generalization of Nash's bargaining problem. Next, some relations between the extension an