The Zeuthen bargaining model occupies a prominent place among those theories of the bargaining process that have been formulated and expounded by economists. Its solution to the bargaining problem is essentially economic, since invariant utility functions based on economic factors alone determine th
An extension of the Nash bargaining problem and the Nash social welfare function
โ Scribed by Mamoru Kaneko
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1980
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 547 KB
- Volume
- 12
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0040-5833
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
This paper provides an extension of Nash's bargaining model. The extension permits the domain of a solution function to contain non-convex sets. First, it is shown that the proposed extension is a mathematical generalization of Nash's bargaining problem. Next, some relations between the extension and the Nash social welfare function are developed. The formal equivalence of the two constructs is demonstrated, and the intuitive significance of the results is discussed.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
This article presents some new, intuitive derivations of several results in the bargaining literature. These new derivations clarify the relationships among these results and allow them to be understood in a unified way. These results concern the way in which the risk posture of the bargainers affec