On the informational basis of social choice
β Scribed by Marc Fleurbaey
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 2003
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 443 KB
- Volume
- 21
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0176-1714
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
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