✦ LIBER ✦

On the communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

✍ Scribed by Goldberg, Paul W.; Pastink, Arnoud

Book ID: 122252679
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2014
Tongue: English
Weight: 304 KB
Volume: 85
Category: Article
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.009

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

Approximations of Nash equilibria

✍ Gül Gürkan; Jong-Shi Pang 📂 Article 📅 2007 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 320 KB

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points

✍ Etessami, Kousha; Yannakakis, Mihalis 📂 Article 📅 2010 🏛 Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics 🌐 English ⚖ 774 KB

On the Complexity of Pareto-Optimal Nash

On the Complexity of Pareto-Optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria

✍ Hoefer, Martin; Skopalik, Alexander 📂 Article 📅 2012 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 481 KB

Structure and complexity of extreme Nash

Structure and complexity of extreme Nash equilibria

✍ M. Gairing; T. Lücking; M. Mavronicolas; B. Monien; P. Spirakis 📂 Article 📅 2005 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 319 KB

Complexity of Strategies and Multiplicit

Complexity of Strategies and Multiplicity of Nash Equilibria

✍ Kalyan Chatterjee 📂 Article 📅 2002 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 80 KB

Approximation of Nash equilibria in Baye

Approximation of Nash equilibria in Bayesian games

✍ Olivier Armantier; Jean-Pierre Florens; Jean-Francois Richard 📂 Article 📅 2008 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 184 KB

## Abstract We define a new concept of constrained strategic equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show that a sequence of CSEs approximates an equilibrium under standard conditions. We also provide an algorithm to implement the CSE approximation method numerically in a broad class of Bayesian g