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On stochastic dynamic stackelberg strategies

✍ Scribed by David Castanon; Michael Athans

Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1976
Tongue
English
Weight
612 KB
Volume
12
Category
Article
ISSN
0005-1098

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✦ Synopsis

In dynamic two-person games with alternating decision, the feedback Stackelberg solution concept represents an adaptive equilibrium between independent players; this concept applies to a class of stochastic multi-stage games.

Summary--Feedback Stackelberg strategies are considered for two-person linear multi-stage games with quadratic performance criteria and noisy measurements. Explicit solutions are given when the information sets are nested; the solutions are closely related to the 'separation theorem' of stochastic control.

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