Incentive problems: A class of stochastic Stackelberg closed-loop dynamic games

✍ Scribed by Tsu-Shuan Chang; Yu-Chi Ho

• Publisher: Elsevier Science
• Year: 1981
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 406 KB
• Volume: 1
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0167-6911
• DOI: 10.1016/s0167-6911(81)80006-0

✦ Synopsis

Then ye is the Stackelberg strategy of L if SUP JqJ,(YetYi-)] g YFER(Yi) Three different versions of a stochastic Stackelberg closedloop dynamic game are presented and solved. These three versions correspond to complete state information structure, one-step-delay sharing information structure, and controlsharing information structure.

The essential difficulty of solving the problem comes from the fact that the information structure is non-nested from the leader's viewpoint. We show that these problems can be reduced to a single solvable generic problem.