On ‘Informationally Robust Equilibria’ for Bimatrix Games
✍ Scribed by Hans Reijnierse; Peter Borm; Mark Voorneveld
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 2006
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 247 KB
- Volume
- 30
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0938-2259
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📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES
In this paper, it is shown that the structure of the set of Pareto equilibria for & bimatrix game resembles the structure of the set of (perfect) Nash equilibria. Msxim~ Pareto sulmets are introduced to take over the role of maximal Nash subsets. It is found that the set of Pareto equlh'brh is the f
This article provides a new approach to the set of (perfect) equilibria. With the help of an equivalence relation on the strategy space of each player, Nash sets and Selten sets are introduced. The number of these sets is finite and each of these sets is a polytope. As a consequence the set of (perf