In this paper, we study the existence of weighted Nash-equilibria and Pareto equilibria for non-compact multiobjective games with multicriteria as applications of the Ky Fan minimax principle in 1972. As results, several existence theorems for non-compact weighted Nash-equilibria and Pareto equilibr
Pareto equilibria for bimatrix games
β Scribed by P.E.M. Borm; M.J.M. Jansen; J.A.M. Potters; S.H. Tijs
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1993
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 415 KB
- Volume
- 25
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0898-1221
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β¦ Synopsis
In this paper, it is shown that the structure of the set of Pareto equilibria for & bimatrix game resembles the structure of the set of (perfect) Nash equilibria. Msxim~ Pareto sulmets are introduced to take over the role of maximal Nash subsets. It is found that the set of Pareto equlh'brh is the finite union of maximal Pareto subsets. By extending the dimension relation for maxims] Nssh subsets to faces of such sets, a dimension rehtion for maximal Pareto subsets is derived. Finally, some remarks are made on the structure of the sets of In'oper and persistent equilibria.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
This article provides a new approach to the set of (perfect) equilibria. With the help of an equivalence relation on the strategy space of each player, Nash sets and Selten sets are introduced. The number of these sets is finite and each of these sets is a polytope. As a consequence the set of (perf
In this paper, we introduce and study a new class of generalized constrained multiobjective games in locally FC-spaces without convexity structure where the number of players may be finite or infinite and all payoff functions get their values in an infinite-dimensional space. By using a Himmelberg t