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Pareto equilibria for bimatrix games

✍ Scribed by P.E.M. Borm; M.J.M. Jansen; J.A.M. Potters; S.H. Tijs


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1993
Tongue
English
Weight
415 KB
Volume
25
Category
Article
ISSN
0898-1221

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✦ Synopsis


In this paper, it is shown that the structure of the set of Pareto equilibria for & bimatrix game resembles the structure of the set of (perfect) Nash equilibria. Msxim~ Pareto sulmets are introduced to take over the role of maximal Nash subsets. It is found that the set of Pareto equlh'brh is the finite union of maximal Pareto subsets. By extending the dimension relation for maxims] Nssh subsets to faces of such sets, a dimension rehtion for maximal Pareto subsets is derived. Finally, some remarks are made on the structure of the sets of In'oper and persistent equilibria.


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