Rationality postulates for preferences are developed from two basic decision theoretic principles, namely: (1) the logic of preference is determined by paradigmatic cases in which preferences are choice-guiding, and (2) excessive comparison costs should be avoided. It is shown how the logical requir
β¦ LIBER β¦
On decision-theoretic foundations for defaults
β Scribed by Ronen I. Brafman; Nir Friedman
- Book ID
- 108306901
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2001
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 239 KB
- Volume
- 133
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0004-3702
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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