## Abstract The still unsettled decision problem for the restricted purely universal formulae ((β)~0~βformulae) of the first order setβtheoretic language based over =, β is discussed in relation with the adoption or rejection of the axiom of foundation. Assuming the axiom of foundation, the related
Decision theoretic foundations for axioms of rational preference
β Scribed by Sven Ove Hansson
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Year
- 1996
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 692 KB
- Volume
- 109
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0039-7857
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Rationality postulates for preferences are developed from two basic decision theoretic principles, namely: (1) the logic of preference is determined by paradigmatic cases in which preferences are choice-guiding, and (2) excessive comparison costs should be avoided. It is shown how the logical requirements on preferences depend on the structure of comparison costs. The preference postulates necessary for choice guidance in a single decision problem are much weaker than completeness and transitivity. Stronger postulates, such as completeness and transitivity, can be derived under the further assumption that the original preference relation should also be capable of guiding choice after any restriction of the original set of alternatives.
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