Hubert Dreyfus claims that "symbolic AI" is a "degenerating research program", i.e. is not making progress. It's hard to see how he would know, since he makes no claim to have read much of the recent literature. In defending "symbolic AI", I shall concentrate on just one part of symbolic AI-the log
Of Hubert Dreyfus and dead horses: some thoughts on Dreyfus' What Computers Still Can't Do: (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992); liii + 354 pages, $13.95
โ Scribed by Timothy Koschmann
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1996
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 1007 KB
- Volume
- 80
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0004-3702
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
The thing to do with a dead horse is to bury it as expeditiously as possible." Anonymous Seven years ago I reviewed one of Dreyfus' earlier books on computers and cognition [22]. My position at that time was that Dreyfus' critique of AI appeared ill-informed. His arguments for why AI, as a research agenda, must ultimately fail seemed, at best, weak. Recently, however, I have noticed that some of the controversies raging within the cognitive science community (e.g., symbolic processing versus situated action [30], the "symbol grounding" issue [13]) seem to have a familiar ring to them. Many of these current discussions appear to call up themes that I have encountered in Dreyfus' earlier writings. Is it possible that Dreyfus has been right all along and that my previous readings of his work have simply missed the point?
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