Necessary Existence

✍ Scribed by Alexander R. Pruss, Joshua L. Rasmussen

• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Year: 2018
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 232
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Necessary Existence breaks ground on one of the deepest questions anyone ever asks: why is there anything? The classic answer is in terms of a necessary foundation. Yet, why think that is the correct answer? Pruss and Rasmussen present an original defense of the hypothesis that there is a concrete necessary being capable of providing a foundation for the existence of things. They offer six main arguments, divided into six chapters. The first argument is an up-to-date presentation and assessment of a traditional causal-based argument from contingency. The next five arguments are new "possibility-based" arguments that make use of twentieth-century advances in modal logic. The arguments present possible pathways to an intriguing and far-reaching conclusion. The final chapter answers the most challenging objection to the existence of necessary things.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover
Necessary Existence
Copyright
Acknowledgments
Contents
1: Introduction
1.1 The Question of Necessary Existence
1.2 Why Necessary Existence Matters
1.3 The “Necessary Being” Survey Results
2: Metaphysical Possibility and Necessity
2.1 Introduction
2.2 What is Metaphysical Modality?
2.3 Modal Logic
2.3.1 Overview
2.3.2 Uncontroversial Aspects
2.3.3 S4 Axiom
2.3.3.1 Violations
2.3.3.2 unconditionality and invariance
2.3.3.3 two accounts of modality
2.3.3.4 weakness and strength
2.3.4 Brouwer and S5 Axioms
2.3.4.1 mutual recognition
2.3.4.2 invariance
2.3.4.3 worlds
2.3.4.4 we cannot make necessities happen
2.3.5 Objection to S4 and S5: No Transitivity of Transworld Identity
2.3.6 Objection to Brouwer and S4: Existentialism
2.4 The S5 Ontological Argument and Two-dimensional Semantics
2.4.1 The Basic Ontological Argument
2.4.2 Two-dimensional Semantics
2.4.3 A Parody
3: An Argument from Contingency
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Argument from Contingency
3.3 On Behalf of the Premises
3.4 Objections
3.4.1 Objection 1 (Hume)
3.4.2 Objection 2 (Hume)
3.4.3 Objection 3 (Hume Again)
3.4.4 Objection 4 (More Hume)
3.4.5 Objection 5 (Hume Once More)
3.4.6 Objection 6 (Kant)
3.4.7 Objection 7 (Kant)
3.4.8 Objection 8 (Graham Oppy, William Rowe, Peter van Inwagen)
3.4.9 Objection 9 (Oppy and Leon)
3.4.10 Objection 10
3.5 Concluding Assessment
4: An Argument from Possible Causes
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Modal Argument from Beginnings
4.3 On Behalf of the Premises
4.4 Objections
4.4.1 Objection 1
4.4.2 Objection 2
4.4.3 Objection 3
4.4.4 Objection 4
4.4.5 Objection 5
4.5 Concluding Assessment
5: From Possible Causes II
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Restricted Causal Principles
5.3 The Restricted Modal Argument
5.4 On Behalf of the Premises
5.5 Objections
5.5.1 Objection 1
5.5.2 Objection 2
5.5.3 Objection 3
5.5.4 Objection 4
5.5.5 Objection 5
5.6 Concluding Assessment
6: From Modal Uniformity
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Uniformity as a Guide to Possibility
6.3 Restricted Modal Uniformity
6.4 Applications to Arguments from Contingency
6.4.1 The Argument from Contingent Existence
6.4.2 The Modal Argument from Beginnings
6.4.3 TheWeak Argument from Beginnings
6.5 Objection
6.6 Concluding Assessment
7: From Necessary Abstracta to Necessary Concreta
7.1 Introduction
7.2 The Main Argument
7.3 Necessarily There Are Abstracta
7.3.1 Truthbearers
7.3.2 Properties
7.3.3 Mathematical Entities
7.3.4 Against Abstracta
7.4 If There Are Abstracta, There Are Concreta
7.5 It’s Possible for There to Be No Contingent Concrete Entities
7.6 Weakening the Possibility of No Concreta
7.7 Concluding Assessment
8: The Argument from Perfections
8.1 History and Introduction
8.2 The Main Argument
8.3 Positivity and the Formal Axioms
8.3.1 Schema or Quantification Over Second-order Properties
8.3.2 A Positive is Not Negative
8.3.3 Negation of a Positive is Negative
8.3.4 Detraction
8.3.5 Atomic Properties
8.4 Necessary Existence is Positive
8.5 Being Capable of Causing is Positive
8.6 Doing Without Properties
8.7 Theism and the Problem of Evil
8.8 Oppy’s Parody
8.9 Concluding Assessment
9: Arguments against a Necessary Being
9.1 Introduction
9.2 The Argument from Conceivability
9.3 The Semantic Problem
9.4 The Logic Argument
9.5 The Subtraction Argument
9.6 Problems with Causation
9.7 The Costly Addition
9.7.1 Modal Anomaly
9.7.2 Causal Anomaly
9.8 Concluding Assessment
Appendix: A Slew of Arguments
A.1 Introduction
A.2 There Must be a Concrete Object
A.2.1 The Causal Theory of Possibility
A.2.2 The Causal Theory of Counterfactuals
A.2.3 Time, Space, and Laws
A.2.4 Knowability and Reasonable Believability
A.2.5 Explicability of Fundamental Truths
A.3 From Almost Necessity to Necessity
A.3.1 Ontological Argument: Direct S5
A.3.2 Love and Mysticism
A.3.3 Ontological Argument: Comparative Greatness
A.3.4 Transworld Mereological Universalism
A.4 Particular Kinds of Concrete Necessary Objects
A.4.1 God
A.4.2 Spacetime
A.4.3 Abstracta
A.4.4 Universe
A.4.5 Necessitism
A.4.6 Lacks
A.5 Causation
A.5.1 Argument from Contingency
A.5.2 Possible Contingency Finitism
A.5.3 Possible All-inclusivity
A.5.4 Boltzmann Brains
A.5.5 Spacetime Again
A.6 Human Life
A.6.1 Mathematics and Mattering
A.6.2 Seeking Understanding
A.6.3 Happiness
A.6.4 Security of Relationship
A.6.5 Attempted Murder
A.7 Miscellaneous
A.7.1 A Root for the System of Chances
A.7.2 The Weak Weak Principle of Sufficient Reason
A.7.3 Explanatory Closure of the Concrete Realm
A.7.4 Our Readers’ Cleverness
Bibliography
Index