Iterated conflicts allow the possibility of co-operative-like behaviour in games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma. The present paper is an attempt to initiate the study of iterated conflicts when, (a) the number of iterations is fixed and finite and (b) the underlying payoff matrix is general, e.g. a
Multiple Trial Two Strategy Conflicts
β Scribed by J.C. Whittaker; C. Cannings
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1994
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 511 KB
- Volume
- 169
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0022-5193
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Much work has been done on iterated conflicts where the one-trial confict is the Prisoner's Dilemma. The present paper is concerned with an iterated contest where the underlying contest has two pure strategies and the underlying payoff matrix is general; this therefore includes the Prisoner's Dilemma as a special case. By limiting the player's memory severely we can almost completely specify the Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) of the two- and infinite-trial conflicts derived from this underlying payoff matrix.
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