Much work has been done on iterated conflicts where the one-trial confict is the Prisoner's Dilemma. The present paper is concerned with an iterated contest where the underlying contest has two pure strategies and the underlying payoff matrix is general; this therefore includes the Prisoner's Dilemm
A two-trial two-strategy conflict
โ Scribed by C. Cannings; J.C. Whittaker
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1991
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 409 KB
- Volume
- 149
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0022-5193
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
Iterated conflicts allow the possibility of co-operative-like behaviour in games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma. The present paper is an attempt to initiate the study of iterated conflicts when, (a) the number of iterations is fixed and finite and (b) the underlying payoff matrix is general, e.g. a mixed Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) could occur in the non-iterated conflict. These assumptions are in contrast to the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. We consider a somewhat special case which none the less produces results of an interesting nature. For those cases where there is no internal ESS in the one trial case the two-trial case is easily resolved. When the former has an internal ESS then the two-trial case yields two ESSs whose supports are a partition of the space of strategies.
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