Monotonicity in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem with dependent voters
✍ Scribed by Daniel Berend; Luba Sapir
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 2006
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 239 KB
- Volume
- 28
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0176-1714
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES
With the aid of a simple discrete probability model, the Condorcet Jury Theorem is extended to situations where there is dependency between judgement. It is shown that negative intra-voter correlation improves on jury competence in the sense that the probability of a correct decision increases. Posi
This paper generalizes Condorcet's jury theorem to the case of symmetrically dependent votes with the help of de Finetti's theorem. Thus, the paper relaxes Condorcet's assumption of independent voting while preserving his main result: In jury-type situations a majority of voters is more likely than