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Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions

✍ Scribed by Stefan Maus; Hans Peters; Ton Storcken

Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2007
Tongue: English
Weight: 248 KB
Volume: 53
Category: Article
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.02.002

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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