Anonymity and continuous social choice
β Scribed by Nick Baigent
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1985
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 223 KB
- Volume
- 14
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0304-4068
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
In this paper, we prove some versions of the Arrovian impossibility theorem in T~ connected alternatives spaces, with the collective rationality condition weakened from transitivity to acyclicity, the Pareto condition replaced by some weaker conditions, and a continuity condition of social preferenc
We discuss the in uence of information contagion on the dynamics of choices in social networks of heterogeneous buyers. Starting from an inhomogeneous cellular automata model of buyers dynamics, we show that when agents try to adjust their reservation price, the tatonnement process does not converge