Logical Self-Reference as a Model for Conscious Experience

✍ Scribed by Andrei G. Khromov

• Publisher: Elsevier Science
• Year: 2001
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 127 KB
• Volume: 45
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0022-2496
• DOI: 10.1006/jmps.2000.1349

✦ Synopsis

The structure of autoreferential statements that describe (or serve as a logical model for) the human conscious experience is analyzed. Autoreferential statements are introduced by autoreferential definitions, such as a=F(a, x), where F is a Boolean function and x is some atomic statement describing the content of the experience, or by analogous systems of inter-related definitions, such as a=F(b, x, y) and b=G(a, x, z). It is argued that only ``noncreative'' (systems of) definitions introduce statements that describe conscious experience, the noncreativeness meaning that no statement with nontautological content can be derived from these definitions. The structure of such (systems of) definitions is comprehensively characterized in a series of theorems. A potential of the model in addressing empirical data is illustrated by applying it to the choice between two alternatives in the absence of a preference criterion.