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Labour-management bargaining modelled as a dynamic game

✍ Scribed by Santiago Fei-Hung Chen; George Leitmann

Publisher
John Wiley and Sons
Year
1980
Tongue
English
Weight
785 KB
Volume
1
Category
Article
ISSN
0143-2087

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